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Long-time readers of this blog may remember the times when we were all very much
upset about the never-ending clashes between the German Federal Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Justice. Come to think of it, those times aren’t
all that far in the past, actually, much as it may seem that way nowadays. (Truly,
little did we know…) At any rate, as a result of the conflict, German constitutional
judges developed the concept of a europäischer Verfassungsgerichtsverbund
– a very German term which Mark Twain would have liked a lot and which I’d
clumsily translate as a "European Club of Constitutional Courts": the realization
that constitutional courts in the EU all sit in a common European boat and therefore
cannot afford to ignore or undercut or push around each other as vigorously as
they’d want to if they wish to survive. They owe each other the responsibility to not
rock the common European boat to a point where it runs full of water, capsizes and
sinks. The German Federal Constitutional Court, under its current President Andreas
Voßkuhle, has been championing this idea for quite some time now after many a
year of glorious big-time boat-rocking in Karlsruhe, and in recent times also the ECJ
under its new President gradually seems to learn to master the urge to prove one’s
own supremacy by setting the boat in powerful sideways motion.
The political seas through which the boat navigates, however, have become
considerably rougher in recent years. This puts the aforesaid European Club of
Constitutional Courts under considerable stress, to an extent that one would hardly
have thought possible in the comparatively idyllic days of the Karlsruhe-Luxembourg
kerfuffle. How should one deal with the Warsaw and Budapest club members? Are
these still courts with which one can cooperate? What if one can’t? This week, a
number of constitutional judges and high-profile academics from Germany, Austria,
Poland and Hungary met at the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin for a conference to
discuss these matters. (Chatham House rules applied.)
As far as Poland is concerned, no regular reader of this blog will be surprised
to learn that it has become far from obvious that there even is such a thing as
functional constitutional jurisdiction at all nowadays. Three of the Constitutional
Tribunal’s sitting judges occupy posts for which actually other judges had been
elected by Parliament. And that was just the start of a long series of assaults against
this formerly venerable institution, most of which have been covered at length on
Verfassungsblog. A fairly recent report of how far the court has sunk since 2015 can
be found here.
Two sitting and three retired constitutional judges from Poland were present at
the conference, all elected before the governing PiS party came to power in 2015.
According to the organizers, efforts were made to invite judges elected by the
PiS majority. But none of them seemed to be eager to make their voices heard
among the members of the European Club of Constitutional Courts. Only one
PiS judge sent a written statement in which he bizarrely accused his colleague
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S#awomira Wronkowska-Ja#kiewicz, who had denounced the arbitrary composition
of the court in numerous dissenting opinions, of having gotten to her office in an
incorrect way herself: She was the only judge who had not been sworn in by the
President. (What he neglected to mention: the head of state wasn’t available for
that job at the time because he had tragically died shortly before at the plane crash
in Smolensk in 2010). The reluctance of the PiS majority in the court to engage in
productive argument is apparently not limited to dialogue within the European Club
of Constitutional Courts. In general, legal issues are hardly discussed anymore at all
in the decision-making chambers, one Polish judge reported. The judges only come
together to vote.
+++A Note from Democracy Reporting International+++
+++++++++++++Paid Advertisement++++++++++++++
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, on the other hand, appears far less shy in
terms of exposing itself to club member critique. It was represented by three sitting
judges, all elected under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz majority, who quietly and politely
held forth about how Hungarian constitutional law guarantees the independence
of the judiciary and how Hungary is a "functioning democratic constitutional state",
not without problems, of course, but who is? One expressed mild concern that
30 years after the fall of communism the Venice Commission still distinguishes
between "old" and "new" democracies and keeps measuring both with double
standards. In general, he said, "rule of law" as a normative yardstick is little more
than an empty 19th century ideal and a political joker for all purposes. In that way,
all contradiction and conflict was doused with and dissolved in the thin acid of
seemingly pluralistic agree-to-disagree relativism that has become so popular in the
ranks of the nationalist-populist right.
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This was received with a wrinkled brow by some of the German, Polish and Austrian
colleagues. He was "irritated", confessed a senior German constitutional judge. After
all, effective constitutional jurisdiction is always "a kind of structural opposition to the
majority" – does this apply in Hungary under the present circumstances?
The answer: The Hungarian Constitutional Court does exist and keeps adjudicating
in a mostly proper way, at times even slapping Viktor Orbán’s wrist, for example in
its decision of last November to suspend the government’s cuts at the expense of
early retirees. But when in the really hard cases, when it comes to upholding minority
rights against the government in the context of a major political conflict – like in the
case of state party funding for opposition parties, for example, or in the CEU case –
the right holders cannot expect the Court to come to their rescue.
Red lines
How should the European Club of Constitutional Courts position itself vis-à-vis such
compromised but still to some extent functional members? What is acceptable, what
is not? The far end of the spectrum was presented by a constitutional law professor
from Caracas, who told the ghastly tale of the Sala Constitucional of Venezuela: In
Nicolas Maduro’s authoritarian regime, constitutional jurisdiction has degenerated
into a mere truncheon of the executive which will declare anything unconstitutional
that gets into the way of the President. Compared to this, even the current Polish
constitutional court looks halfway respectable. So where are the red lines?
Some argued that German constitutional judges should be aware how lucky they
were to gain the powerful position the have and how much it takes for a court
to be robust enough to weather heavy political storms. In cases as extreme as
Venezuela, according to that opinion, the judges of the constitutional court are
committing perversion of justice and should be criminally prosecuted. In less extreme
cases, however, if a court restrains itself and tries to maintain a minimum of legal
functionality in the face of overpowering politics, they deserve understanding and
support from the European Club of Constitutional Courts.
+++++A Note from ICON-S+++++++
CALL FOR PAPERS – ICON-S German Chapter Inaugural Conference: Law and
Order / Recht und Ordnung, Humboldt University of Berlin, 28 – 29 March 2019
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Others, on the other hand, warned all the more strongly against accepting
compromises. The Federal Constitutional Court, one of its members said, bears
the responsibility after all to decide whether or not an asylum seeker can be
deported or a person wanted by means of an EU arrest warrant can be extradited.
A member of the Austrian Constitutional Court added that the rule of law may not a
hard-cut concept but still has an indispensable normative core which includes the
independence of the judiciary. "One cannot say that if a judge is independent in the
morning, then all is well, and if he changes his mind in the afternoon, then it isn’t."
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The red line is crossed if the "judiciary is switched off or brought in
line" ("Ausschaltung or Gleichschaltung"), said another German constitutional judge
who, at the same time, expressed skepticism regarding the sanctioning options
of the European Court of Justice in that case. The setup of the judiciary is in the
domain of the member states and beyond the competences of the EU, after all. "If
I overplay the division of competences by normatizing Article 2 (TEU, i.e. the basic
values of the Union including the rule of law, VB), I will run into acceptance problems
as a court."
Another German constitutional judge suspiciously noted that there are "crisis
winners" in Luxembourg who hope to boost their own power in the conflict with
Poland as a "windfall profit". This, the Karlsruhe judge said sternly, will be "kept in
mind" (no one said that club members must renounce all fun, do they?).
Self-healing powers
Ultimately, it is the Polish and Hungarians who will have to clean up their
constitutional order if one day authoritarian rule in their countries comes to an end.
In Poland, this day might hopefully come quite soon: Probably in November 2019,
there will be general elections, and there is a slight but existent chance that the PiS
will be voted out again. Considerations of how to repair and rebuild the constitutional
state have already begun: A conference on this topic will take place at the Batory
Foundation in Warsaw at the beginning of next week.
With respect to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, it is by no means clear, however,
that an institution as badly damaged as that can still be repaired at all. According to
a professor from Warsaw, the ordinary and the administrative judiciary are preparing
themselves to compensate for the Constitutional Court’s failure (a notion that left a
German judge with a "shiver") and to resort to international and European law for this
purpose. Whether the post-PiS Constitutional Court would recover from this loss of
relevance appears to be anything but certain.
And as far as the judges are concerned: the first thing on the "day after", one of the
Polish participants told me, would be to get rid of the three so-called "anti-judges"
who occupy the seats of legally elected members. But even then, of the remaining
12 judges only four will not be nominated by the PiS at the time of the election. To
repair the damage done by PiS will take a tremendous lot of skill in order to avoid the
creation of a new victimization myth with which PiS could regain power all the more
easily in the next round. Many imagine some sort of a round table, like in the 80s.
But for that you need the equivalent to the reform communists of the time, people
from the outgoing power prepared to negotiate, which probably will not be easy to
come by in the event of a change of power in Warsaw.
If, on the other hand, the PiS wins the election, then Poland will very likely go down
the authoritarian road to its bitter end, according to the people I spoke to – like
Hungary, but without Fidesz’s two-thirds majority and the resulting nimbleness in
shaping the constitutional framework. In December, the terms of office of another
three remaining non-PiS judges at the Constitutional Tribunal will end. And as far as
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the judiciary in general is concerned, PiS is expected to fight no holds barred. Even
now, judges who refer cases to the ECJ with regard to judicial independence are
already being subjected to disciplinary proceedings. If PiS remains in power, they will
most likely also come after the retired judges, including constitutional judges, in order
to strip them of their status as judges and thereby of their public authority. One more
reason to be curious about what this fateful year 2019 – to which I wish you all the
best, by the way! – will bring.
Westminster follies
After a few quiet days over the holiday season, Verfassungsblog has picked up
speed again. Plenty of things are happening to keep us busy. Take the UK: The
parliamentary jumble in the run-up to the "meaningful vote" on Brexit this Tuesday
defies all belief and left even the most committed policy nerds seem hard pressed
to make sense of what going on in the House of Commons. JACK SIMSON CAIRD
explains the ruthlessly innovative and constitutionally momentous ways in which
Speaker John Bercow interprets the parliamentary rules.
In Hungary, an effective protest movement against Viktor Orbán seems to be finally
forming, but in the meantime the government has announced to pack the judiciary
with Fidesz loyalists by means of the introduction of a separate administrative
jurisdiction. RENÁTA UITZ describes with barely concealed anger how the
Hungarian government is establishing its illiberal democracy in plain sight and in
friendly dialogue with the European constitutional actors.
In Brazil, right-wing extremist Jair Bolsonaro has been inaugurated at the beginning
of the year. The Federal Judge Sergio Moro, famous for being the one who put
former President Lula da Silva in prison, will head the Ministry of Justice, which has
been expanded to include gigantic "anti-terrorist" powers. DOUGLAS CARVALHO
RIBEIRO describes his role and intentions (German).
In Bulgaria, an attack on the independent judiciary is underway, largely unnoticed by
the European public, the latest development of which is analyzed by RADOSVETA
VASSILEVA.
In the USA, the government is trying to cut back the right of asylum to solve the
alleged "immigration crisis" which, according to the analysis of CLAIRE THOMAS, is
not taking place at the Mexican border but in the hopelessly inadequate staffing and
equipment of the asylum system.
In the EU, there are (or should be) no internal border controls under the Schengen
treaty, which is why some resourceful member states have come up with the idea to
hold private bus companies liable for keeping irregular immigrants out. The ECJ has
now put an end to this practice. FABIAN MICHL examines the decision (German).
GIACOMO DELEDONNE reports on the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court
to consider the 4-percent threshold for the European elections unproblematic, in
contrast to the German Federal Constitutional Court.
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In Germany, Federal Minister of Justice Katarina Barley has launched a debate
about a women’s quota in parliament, which some senior constitutional law
professors find a catastrophically bad idea. CARA RÖHNER, on the other hand,
argues for a material perspective on democracy that would allow to recognize the
lack of representation of women as a democratic problem (German).
A few days before Christmas, the German Federal Constitutional Court rejected
the motion of the far-right AfD to declare Angela Merkel’s refugee policy since 2015
unconstitutional as inadmissible. I regard this as a missed opportunity, for reasons
I have written down here. MATHIAS HONER, on the other hand, applauds the
decision and argues that there is no general parliamentary prerogative to have a say
in all essential decisions of the state (both German).
WIEBKE FRÖHLICH and INDRA SPIEKER examine the discriminatory effect of
algorithms in the case of the software of the Austrian employment authority, which
filters persons according to their labour market perspectives and assigns poorer
prospects to women (German).
FREDERIK VON HARBOU analyses the German government draft of an
Immigration of Skilled Workers Act (German).
ANDREAS GLASER looks at the Institutional Agreement between the EU and
Switzerland and how it will affect the relationship between both (German).
The German Federal Supreme Court has submitted the controversial Children’s
Marriage Act, which came into force in 2017 and strictly curtails the recognition of
marriages of minors abroad, to the Federal Constitutional Court for review, much to
the delight of BETTINA HEIDERHOFF (German).
LASSE SCHULDT describes how fake news is legally dealt with in Southeast Asia
and how these laws are abused to fight political opponents (German).
The UN Migration Pact has been severely criticized by, among others, the well-
known legal philosopher Reinhard Merkel. HANNAH BIRKENKÖTTER and
SINTHIOU BUSZESWKI examine the merits of the critique from the perspective of
international law (German).
Elsewhere
DANIEL SARMIENTO is amazed at the enormous increase in the importance of the
ECJ infringement procedure last year.
ARMIN VON BOGDANDY asks, against the background of the evaluation of the
ECtHR, in whose name the Strasbourg Court adjudicates, and answers: in the name
of the European club of liberal democracies.
ILKER TSAVOULOGLU examines the recent Strasbourg judgment on the rights of
the Muslim minority in Greece.
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OLIVIER BEAUD reviews the recent history of the Fifth Republic as, this being
France, a bande dessinée.
AGUSTÍN RUIZ ROBLEDO sees the decision of the Irish Senate to ban imports
of products from the Israeli occupied territories as an interesting signal of the
emancipation of the Second Chamber.
BEATRÍZ ACHA does not consider the new right-wing VOX party in Spain to be
(neo-)fascist.
PHILIP ALLOTT warns on the occasion of the Brexit disaster against the direct-
democratic tyranny of the majority in the UK.
ROBERT CHESNEY answers some urgent questions about the possibility of US
President Trump getting his wall financed by declaring a national emergency.
ALVIN CHEUNG writes about the growing doubts about the independence of the
judiciary in Hong Kong.
JENNY DOMINO describes how Facebook is becoming a tool for suppressing
freedom of expression in the Philippines and Myanmar.
So much for this first editorial in 2019. All the best to you, and take care,
Max Steinbeis
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